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Abstract
In this article, epistemological perspectives that have shaped and affected the scientific quest for understanding what 
neuropsychologists term “executive functions” are reviewed. Executive functions refer to the control functions of cognition 
and behavior. The underlying thesis of the paper is that one’s epistemological orientation determines how one sees the 
interaction between brain functions and our status in the world. Each different orientation thus carries with it implications 
with regard to how executive functions operate, as well as how, therefore, one should try to assess them. Until recently, 
these functions were approached through two primary epistemological points of view. One is analytic, which has its roots in 
the positivistic movement. The other approach is synthetic, otherwise known as “romantic science”, and forms the basis of 
the work of the prominent Russian neuropsychologist A.R. Luria. A third epistemological perspective, articulated under the 
umbrella of ‘embodied cognition’ approaches, has been advanced in the last 20 years, and is associated most closely with the 
work of Francisco Varela. A review of, and reflection on how these perspectives have affected research and clinical practice 
in neuropsychology is provided. 
Key words: Executive functions, neurophenomenology, neuropsychology, embodied cognition, epistemology, classical 
science, romantic science, clinical evaluation.
PERSPECTIVAS EPISTEMOLÓGICAS EN EL ESTUDIO CIENTÍFICO  
Y LA EVALUACIÓN CLÍNICA DE LAS FUNCIONES EJECUTIVAS
Resumen
En este artículo se examinan perspectivas epistemológicas que han moldeado e influenciado la búsqueda científica orientada 
hacia comprender aquello que los neuropsicólogos denominan las “funciones ejecutivas (FE). El término funciones ejecutivas 
se refiere a aspectos de control de la cognición y la conducta. Las ideas expuestas en este manuscrito presuponen que la 
orientación epistemológica de una persona determina la manera en la que ella conceptualiza la interacción entre las funciones 
cerebrales y su entorno físico. Cada una de esas orientaciones conlleva suposiciones acerca del modo como operan las FE y, 
por ende, el modo como deben ser evaluadas. Hasta fechas recientes esto se había abordado principalmente desde el punto 
de vista de dos perspectivas teóricas. Una de ellas, la analítica, tiene sus raíces en el movimiento positivista. La otra, también 
conocida como “ciencia romántica” es sintética, y provee las bases del trabajo científico del muy celebrado neuropsicólogo 
ruso A.R. Luria. Una tercera perspectiva, formulada en el marco de la “cognición corpórea”, ha sido propuesta en los últimos 
20 años, y está más estrechamente asociada con los trabajos de Francisco Varela. Se examina aquí, por medio de una revisión 
reflexiva e integradora de la literatura pertinente, la manera como esas tres perspectivas epistemológicas han influido sobre la 
investigación y la práctica clínica de la neuropsicología. 
Palabras clave: Funciones ejecutivas, neurofenomenología, neuropsicología, cognición corpórea, epistemología, ciencia 
clásica, ciencia romántica, evaluación clínica.
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INTRODUCTION
Executive functions (EFs) are central to the performance 
of complex acts and play a role in all higher cognitive pro-
cesses. They include the ability to plan, sequence, initiate 
and organize actions, set priorities, use feedback to guide 
behavior, maintain focus in the face of distraction, switch 
strategies, and inhibit responses as needed. In children, 
their impact on learning and self-regulation is critical, as 
is their contribution to the acquisition of, and adherence 
to, social norms. Executive dysfunction is common to a 
number of disorders that affect the nervous system, and 
the identification of executive dysfunction is important 
in allowing treatment to be better focused. Yet the field, 
despite having made significant strides in unraveling many 
aspects of executive function, is still not close to provid-
ing a cohesive, integrated view that fully encompasses its 
complexities. However, the way in which EFs are assessed 
and studied is a product of one’s epistemological point of 
view, since EFs are control functions that determine how 
we interact with the world. That is, how one conceptual-
izes the factors involved in the way humans adapt to the 
world will inform and define the way EFs, which are the 
control functions of the brain, are conceptualized, studied 
and assessed. 
 In this article we review the epistemological perspec-
tives that have guided most research in science, and, more 
specifically, neuroscience, including the investigation of 
EFs. This may help to understand differences in approaches 
to the assessment of EFs that can be found in the field of 
neuropsychology. Furthermore, the relatively recent ap-
pearance of a new epistemological perspective has impli-
cations for assessment that challenge the field to develop 
methodologies that can more accurately reflect individual 
differences in a more holistic way. 
Two approaches have historically characterized how 
scientists have tackled the investigation of executive 
functions: one synthetic, the other analytic (also referred 
to as the ‘classical perspective’). They have their roots in 
two disparate philosophical traditions: the first, known as 
‘romantic science’, is a holistic perspective, which became 
the dominant epistemological force from the mid to the late 
1800’s; the latter is the positivist movement (also referred 
to as the ‘classical perspective’) that flourished in Austria 
in the early 1900s. 
A third perspective, while still challenging neuropsy-
chologists to formulate a viable clinical methodology for the 
assessment of EFs, provides a conceptual bridge between 
the phenomenology of experience and constraints imposed 
by human physiological functioning (Varela, 1996).
The positivistic epistemological approach
Proponents of the analytic perspective had their strong-
hold in Vienna. An impressive cadre of scientists spurred 
the movement that created a science of logic and cold facts. 
Mach is credited with having provided the initial impetus for 
what would culminate in the Circle of Vienna, a powerful 
force whose influence spread in Europe, later to shape the 
scientific enterprise in North America (2004). Its guiding 
principles are stated in a Manifesto drafted in the 1920s, and 
leave no doubts about the views of its followers. Entitled 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis (The 
Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle), its 
authorship is uncertain, but it is assummed to have been a 
collaborative effort (Murzi, 2005). The following are quotes 
from the document [our emphasis]:
PERSPECTIVAS EPISTEMOLÓGICAS NO ESTUDO CIENTÍFICO E A AVALIAÇÃO 
CLÍNICA DAS FUNÇÕES EXECUTIVAS.
Resumo
Neste artigo examinam-se as perspectivas epistemológicas que moldaram e influenciaram a busca científica orientada à 
compreender aquilo que os neuropsicólogos denominam as “funções executivas (FE). O termo funções executivas se refere a 
aspectos de controle da cognição e a conduta. As ideias expostas neste manuscrito pressupõem que a orientação epistemológica 
de uma pessoa determina a maneira em que ela conceitualiza a interação entre as funções cerebrais e seu entorno físico. Cada 
uma dessas orientações leva a suposições sobre o modo como operam as FE e, portanto, o modo como devem ser avaliadas. 
Até datas recentes isto havia sido abordado principalmente desde o ponto de vista de duas perspectivas teóricas. Uma delas, a 
analítica, tem suas raízes no movimento positivista. A outra, também conhecida como “ciência romântica” é sintética, e fornece 
as bases do trabalho científico do muito celebrado neuropsicólogo russo A.R. Luria. Uma terceira perspectiva, formulada no 
marco da “cognição corpórea”, foi proposta nos últimos 20 anos, e está mais estreitamente associada com os trabalhos de 
Francisco Varela. Examina-se aqui, através de uma revisão reflexiva e integradora da literatura pertinente, a maneira como 
essas três perspectivas epistemológicas influíram sobre a pesquisa e a prática da neuropsicologia.
Palavras chave: Funções executivas, neurofenomenologia, neuropsicologia, cognição corpórea, epistemología, ciência 
clássica, ciência romântica, avaliação clínica.
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“In science there are no ‘depths’; there is surface every-
where: all experience forms a complex network, which 
cannot always be surveyed, and can often be grasped 
only in parts....The judgments of arithmetic, geometry, 
and certain fundamental principles of physics, that Kant 
took as examples of a priori knowledge will be discussed 
later....It is precisely in the rejection of the possibility 
of’ synthetic knowledge a priori that the basic thesis of 
modern empiricism lies. The scientific world-conception 
knows only empirical statements about things of all 
kinds, and analytic statements of logic and mathematics. 
We have characterized the scientific world-conception 
essentially by two features. First it is empiricist and 
positivist: there is knowledge only from experience, 
which rests on what is immediately given. This sets the 
limits for the content of legitimate science. Second, the 
scientific world-conception is marked by application 
of a certain method, namely logical analysis. The aim 
of scientific effort is to reach the goal, unified science, 
by applying logical analysis to the empirical material” 
(Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis).
Wundt is reputed to have founded experimental psy-
chology along these premises (Boring, 1950). Inspired by 
the successes of physiologist Gustav Fechner in studying 
sensory perception by manipulating stimuli and having 
subjects report back their experience, Wundt sought to 
emulate researchers in the natural sciences who, through 
careful measurement of observable phenomena, were making 
inroads towards identifying and understanding the building 
blocks (atoms) of matter and living organisms. As for other 
aspects of the human experience, he felt they were not the 
proper subject of scientific psychology, but the province of 
the “humanities” such as art, literature, and anthropology, 
which he termed Volkerpsychologie (Guski-Leinwand, 
2009; Wong, 2009).
As the historic turn of events would have it, positivism 
flourished in North America, largely as a consequence of 
the exodus from Austria and Germany of many intellectu-
als in the “Enlightenment” tradition, and their relocation 
in the “New World”. In psychology, Titchner, a disciple of 
Wundt, introduced structuralism to America. This approach 
sought to identify the most basic elements or components 
of the mind based on introspection, and then study their 
connections to determine an overall mental structure and 
conscious experience. 
In the United States, a seminal publication by William 
James (1890) greatly influenced the way this discipline was 
to be approached in the decades to follow. This two-tome 
opus, Principles of Psychology (1890), caused James’ name 
to become most readily associated with Pragmatism, an 
approach to science which, in principle, aligns itself with 
the scientific method pursued by positivists. Little is made, 
however, of his other writings, which raise significant ques-
tions as to whether his approach to psychology was ever 
reductionist (e.g., James, 1902/2012; Stanley, 2012; Taylor, 
2012). This matter is revisited later in this manuscript. 
The romantic epistemological approach
Romantic scholars, contrary to those who espouse the 
Classical tradition, seek “neither to split living reality into 
its elementary components nor to represent the wealth 
of life’s concrete events in abstract models that lose the 
properties of the phenomena themselves. It is of the utmost 
importance to Romantics to preserve the wealth of living 
reality, and they aspire to a science that retains its riches” 
(Luria, Cole & Cole, 1979, p. 174). 
Romanticism arose as a reaction to the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment. Romantics rejected such epistemology 
as reductionist, for “ignoring the forces of imagination, 
mystery, and sentiment” (Kaboub, 2008, p. 343). They 
opposed an approach aimed at dissecting information from 
the world to quench a thirst for knowledge; one that led to 
the manipulation of nature. They believed that knowledge 
could only be attained through the keen observation of facts 
and careful experimentation, and could only be attained by 
those who truly appreciated and respected nature. As the 
heyday of positivism has been called the Age of Reason, 
the Romantic era has also been called the Age of Reflection.
Among the representatives of Romantic scholars, few 
exemplify their ideal better than Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe. Lauded for his masterpiece Faustus, the scope of 
his achievements in a wide range of matters is such that it 
is hard to decide on their relative importance. Perhaps most 
compelling as a demonstration of the divergence between 
the two opposing epistemologies under consideration are 
the experiments he conducted to probe into the complexi-
ties of human color perception. Goethe focused on color 
perception’s irreducible quality, which argued against its con-
ceptualization as an epiphenomenon of sensation. Goethe’s 
painstaking experiments challenged Isaac Newton’s theory 
of light, the prevailing view of his time. Newton’s theory 
maintains that all the colors in the spectrum are contained in 
white light. Passing white (colorless) light through a prism 
results in its being decomposed into all its constituents. In 
attempting to replicate this, however, Goethe found that 
this is not necessarily the case. Instead, the perspective of 
the perceiver determined what colors could be “obtained”. 
As Goethe states: “But how I was, astonished as I looked 
at a white wall through the prism, that stays white!. That 
only where it came upon some darkened area, it showed 
some color, then at last, around the window sill all the 
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colors shone. It didn’t take long before I knew there was 
something significant about color to be brought forth, and 
I spoke as through an instinct out loud, that the Newtonian 
teachings were false” (Wikipedia, Color Theory; see also 
Sepper, 2005).
The impact of this and multiple scientific discoveries in 
the morphology (a term he coined) of plants and animals, 
geology, meteorology and geology among others, attests 
to the versatility and power of his “zarte empirie” (delicate 
empiricism), which “may yet prove to be his most influential 
contribution to science” (Wahl, 2005, p. 58). The relevance 
of Goethe’s approach to physics has been described, along 
with its contemporary applications. A case in point is the 
invention of instant photography by Edwin Land (Ribe & 
Steinle, 2002).
Epistemological approaches to neuroscience
In the neurosciences the positivist, or analytic, approach 
has been the norm for a good part of the last century. Little 
is heard about “romantic science”, yet its importance to 
the “modern” view of the brain, and by implication its 
contributions to current approaches to the science of the 
mind, are underscored by Richardson:
“Historians of neuroscience, of biological psychology, 
and of neurology concur in viewing the late eighteen cen-
tury and early nineteenth centuries as a crucial period for 
the emergence of an unprecedented series of hypotheses 
and discoveries concerning the brain and nervous system. 
Only in the romantic era, in fact, was the brain established 
as the organ of thought […] Equally important -and con-
troversial- developments included the rise of comparative 
neuroanatomy, the framing of adaptationist and function-
alist analyses of specific features of the mind and brain, a 
fundamental redefinition of the brain as an assemblage of 
parts or ‘organs’ rather than an undifferentiated whole, and 
anti-dualistic psychological models founded on the mind’s 
embodiment, placing novel emphases on automatic and 
unconscious mental processes and on body-mind interac-
tion” (Richardson, 2001, p. 2).
In a paper entitled Knowing and knowledge: A plural 
approximation, Manrique-Tisnés (2008) offers a compre-
hensive and well-articulated analysis of the shortcomings 
of the logical-empirical approach to scientific inquiry. Con-
sonant with Richardson’s arguments, he provides a number 
of well-founded reasons for the inescapable conclusion that 
an empiricist epistemology falls short of being the golden 
road to true knowledge, as it proponents have maintained. 
From the perspective of the study of executive function, 
it is of interest that he brings up the matter of ethics as 
part and parcel of the process of knowing, for this activity 
does not take place in a vacuum, in an abstract world of 
cold cognition. Rather, perception is determined by mental 
structures that are acquired in the process of development 
in a socio-historical and political context. Those processes 
are unconscious, and comprise what cognitive psycholo-
gists have termed “tacit knowledge”. As a corollary and a 
point brought to the fore by Thomas Kuhn and Karl Pop-
per half a century ago, empirical findings are interpreted 
within a scientific paradigm: schemata that make up the 
socio-historical zeitgeist of the scientific enterprise. A 
coup de grace dealt to logical empiricism’s tenet that truth 
may only be attained through reason, is that the scientific 
method itself proceeds on the principle of falsification (i.e., 
the rejection of the null hypothesis), based on empirical 
evidence. From this perspective, the truth is fleeting and 
uncertain, a way the mind seeks to gain a sense of stability 
in a world of uncertainties. 
A leading proponent of a romantic epistemological ap-
proach to neuropsychological assessment was the Russian 
A.R. Luria. An assumption of Luria’s formulation of 
executive function (e.g., Luria, 1966, 1973a & 1973b) is 
its interdependent relationship to cortical tone on the one 
hand, and its sociocultural constraints on the other (Luria, 
Cole & Cole, 1979). To that should be added the unique 
trajectory of any given individual. Whether it is possible 
to build a scientific corpus on higher level functions that 
can speak to such a level of specificity (i.e., incorporating 
both fluctuations in physiological state and sociocultural 
differences in individual experience) is a question that is 
at the very core of the epistemology of science in general, 
and cognitive neuroscience specifically.
Neurophenomenology and embodied cognition: A new 
epistemological approach  
Thus far we have been discussing two main epistemologi-
cal approaches to the study of higher cognitive functions, 
specifically that which has been deemed the pinnacle in 
their phylogenetic ascent -i.e., executive function. While 
the field has not reached consensus regarding its definition, 
that should not be a matter of concern. This is, after all, the 
nature of scientific inquiry: as our knowledge of a subject 
deepens and expands, definitions and categories change. 
It is important to reiterate here the primary differences 
of the two epistemological approaches we have been dis-
cussing. One, per force reductionist, seeks to distill the 
essential in the world so as to arrive at the laws that govern 
it; the other, inclusive, seeks to incorporate the experience 
of reality into its explanations. For the first approach the 
question becomes what to leave out; for the second, how 
to go about integrating the myriad elements inherent in a 
phenomenology of experience. 
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The mind-body dualism proclaimed by Rene Descartes 
in the 16th century clearly stated that “there is a great differ-
ence between mind and body inasmuch as body is by nature 
always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible… the 
mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body” 
(Descartes, cited in McNerney, 2011, P.1 ). This assump-
tion has dominated most of Western thought, which “can 
be summed up in two basic ideas: reason is disembodied 
because the mind is disembodied and reason is transcendent 
and universal” (McNerney, 2011).
Thus for Descartes, the mind and reason function 
abstractly and logically, unaffected by body states. In 
the words of Cowart (2005), “[t]he cognitivist/classicist 
research program can be defined as a rule-based, informa-
tion- processing model of cognition that 1) characterizes 
problem-solving in terms of inputs and outputs, 2) assumes 
the existence of symbolic, encoded representations which 
enable the system to devise a solution by means of compu-
tation, and 3) maintains that cognition can be understood 
by focusing primarily on an organism’s internal cognitive 
processes (that is, specifically those involving computation 
and representation).”
This perspective has been challenged on various counts, 
but it remains the prevalent paradigm (Cowart, 2005; 
Wilson & Foglia, 2011). A central point of critics of the 
prevailing paradigm is that cognition is embodied, i.e., 
“deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of 
an agent... aspects of the agent’s body beyond the brain 
play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in 
cognitive processing”. 
Weighing in on this discussion is a recent paradigm that 
has attempted to offer a fresh approach: Neurophenomenol-
ogy (Varela, 1996; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). 
At the center of this new approach is what proponents refer 
to as “the embodied mind”. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
(1991) introduced the concept of enaction, to deal with the 
limitations of the representational view. They emphasize 
that “the experienced world is portrayed and determined 
by mutual interactions between the physiology of the 
organism, its sensorimotor circuit and the environment...
the structural coupling of brain-body-world constitutes the 
kernel of their program of embodied cognition, building 
on the classical phenomenological idea that cognitive 
agents bring forth a world by means of the activity of their 
situated living bodies” (Wilson & Foglia, 2011). “As the 
metaphor of “bringing forth a world” of meaningful experi-
ence implies: in this view, knowledge emerges through the 
primary agent’s bodily engagement with the environment, 
rather than being simply determined by and dependent 
upon either pre-existent situations or personal construals” 
(Wilson and Foglia, 2011).
Epistemology and clinical assessment of executive functions
Epistemology is the field of philosophy that concerns 
itself with how knowledge is acquired, with distinctions 
made between empirical and non-empirical methods of 
acquiring such knowledge. In neuropsychology, reasoning 
is considered an executive function, but the ability to apply 
logical operations and to problem-solving at an abstract 
level can be dissociated from the ability to carry out real-
life tasks, behavior that is heavily dependent on executive 
functions (and which therefore also determine the acquisi-
tion of new knowledge by guiding our interaction with the 
environment). Adaptive behavior relies on decisions that 
musty take into account the relative probability of events 
and consequences of action in an uncertain and unpredict-
able world. Thus, the neuropsychological assessment of a 
person’s ability to function successfully should incorporate 
the latter as well as the former abilities. In what follows, 
some key aspects of the study of executive functions from 
the analytic perspective will be briefly reviewed, then Luria’s 
perspective, as an example in the romantic tradition, will 
be presented, and lastly, am ‘embodied cognition’ approach 
to the assessment of executive functions will be discussed.
The Study of Executive Functions from the Analytic Per-
spective
Despite dating over 150 years, the scientific study of 
executive functions did not occupy center stage until well 
into the second half of the 20th century. Positivism reigned 
in all spheres of intellectual and scientific pursuit in the 
U.S.A. Behaviorism, which ironically evolved from Luria’s 
nemesis, Ivan Petrovich Pavolv, dominated psychology. 
The mind, as it was not observable, could not constitute 
the object of study of psychology.
In the U.S.A., the scientific study of the mind emerged in 
the mid-50’s, ending the behaviorist dry spell that followed the 
prolific and influential work of, among others, Harvard 
psychologist William James. This movement, that came to 
be known as the “Cognitive Revolution”, counted among its 
major forces with George Miller, Noam Chomsky, Jerome 
Bruner, Donald Hebb and Herb Simon, among others. Karl 
Pribram, a primatologist, is credited with coining the term 
“executive function”, which he related to the activity of the 
frontal lobes (Pribram, 1973; 1990). His work integrated 
neurophysiological data with a more traditional information-
processing perspective (e.g., Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 
1960). As the field matured, cognitive psychology, and 
later the cognitive neurosciences, would emerge as broad 
areas of study, as knowledge about mechanisms underlying 
cognition, behavior and emotion expanded.
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Since then, the proliferation of published work in the 
neurosciences in general, and the cognitive neurosciences 
in particular, has been staggering; the exploration of new 
technologies and discoveries in the field is overwhelming, 
to the point that integration seems, at times, elusive. Some 
integrative models have appeared along the way. Bilder, in 
a recent article, provides a review of executive models that 
have attempted an integration including those advanced by 
Jacobsen, Halstead, Teuber, Fuster, Mishkin, Sanides, Stuss 
and Benson. Damasio, Mesulam and Posner have provided 
widely cited and useful models as well.
As his review concludes, Bilder singles out the model 
put forth by A.R. Luria (1964; 1973a; 1973b) and elaborated 
upon by his disciple Goldberg (1990b), for “its elegance 
and simplicity, [as it] provides an overall functional frame-
work within which the process of executive function takes 
place” (Bilder, 2012, p. 4). [It thus appears that a Romantic 
scientist’s integrative synthesis is necessary to provide 
cohesiveness to the scientific quest!]. In the next section 
we turn to a review of this perspective.
A.R. Luria’s Romantic approach to the study of EFs
To expand on the reason why he favors a Luria-Goldberg 
account of executive function, Bilder states: 
“A major premise of ...[this model]... is that the frontal 
lobes are organized in a hierarchical fashion, which Luria 
referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary divisions of 
the frontal cortex. These primary, secondary, and tertiary 
divisions approximate the cytoarchitectonic divisions 
referring to the primary motor cortex, the premotor cortex, 
and the prefrontal cortex, respectively. Syndrome analy-
sis of patients with discrete lesions showed systematic 
increases in the complexity of behavioral disruptions 
paralleling the cytoarchitectonic progression...This basic 
scheme has enormous explanatory power, and, with 
some refinements and elaborations, has been used to 
help understand wide-ranging lesion effects including 
not only elementary and complex motor syndromes, but 
also diverse deficits in expressive language, conceptual 
disorganization, and thought disorder, and more general 
problems in the initiation and regulation of complex 
behavior” (Bilder, 2012, p. 6).
It bears delving further into the nature of Luria’s ana-
lytical/romantic approach to the scientific endeavor, aptly 
illustrated in the work of Michael Cole on the one hand, and 
Oliver Sacks on the other, both scientists whose work was 
profoundly influenced by Luria. Cole points to the social-
historical core in Luria’s science of the mind. Cole’s own 
life work, cross-cultural psychology is, in many respects, 
a brain child of Luria and Vygotsky’s pioneering research 
in Central Asia in the 1930s (Luria, Cole & Cole, 1979). 
Cole (1990) characterized Luria’s scientific method as 
orthogonal to that which characterizes scientific inquiry 
in the U.S. Borrowing from Tupper, he contrasts the syn-
thetic nature of Luria’s scientific method to the analytic, 
hypothesis-testing approach emblematic of the practice of 
science in the U.S. Cole explains that “whereas Luria at-
tempts to test an overriding metatheory using data derived 
from clinical neurology, scientists in the analytic tradition 
have no overall theory, preferring instead to test specific 
hypotheses…and their data are derived from psychometric 
tests. In terms of assessment techniques, Luria’s methods 
are qualitative and flexible; he seeks links in functional 
systems, his methods are clinical-theoretical and case 
oriented. By contrast, North American neuropsychologists 
rely on… actuarial, quantitative, group studies” (Tupper, 
cited in Cole & Levitin, 2005, p. 35).
Oliver Sacks (1990) remarks on and identifies with the 
“romantic science” side to Luria’s work. He quotes Luria:
“Since the beginning of this century there has been 
enormous technical progress which has changed the very 
structure of the scientific enterprise…. Reductionism, the 
effort to reduce complex phenomena to their elementary 
particles, became the guiding principle of scientific efforts. 
In psychology it seemed that by reducing psychological 
events to elementary physiological rules, we could attain 
the ultimate explanation of human behavior….In this at-
mosphere, the rich and complex picture of human behavior 
which had existed in the nineteenth century disappeared” 
(cited in Sacks, 1990, p. 183).
Luria saw both approaches as complementary and their 
unbalanced use as equally undesirable. Thus, he warns of 
the dangers of being swayed by a purely phenomenological 
account, one that lacks the logical rigor of a step-by-step 
analysis. Yet, as Sacks points out, “Luria’s own clinical 
experience, to which he is absolutely faithful, as well as his 
readings of the great 19th century clinicians, provides an 
overwhelming demonstration of the opposite danger- the 
danger of reductionism, of an analysis which finally loses 
the very reality it seeks to analyze” (Sacks, 1990, p. 183).
Executive functions and ‘embodied cognition’ 
Returning to the matter of the importance of this issue 
to executive function, the “cold cognition” debate that has 
occupied neuropsychologists since the mid- 1990s brought 
about a discussion in the field about the role, if any, of 
emotions in thinking, self-regulation and problem-solving, 
or whether emotions and information about physiological 
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states should not be considered a component of executive 
function. In 1994 Antonio Damasio published Descartes’ 
error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. Citing the 
work of Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), among others, 
Damasio put forth the somatic marker hypothesis, arguing 
that emotions need to be integrated into, and modulate/guide 
cognitive reasoning towards adaptive decision-making. 
In the event of damage to emotion-regulating areas of the 
brain, either the person vacillates and cannot make a deci-
sion (i.e., can’t decide which of several courses of action 
is better) or the person is influenced by the immediate and 
most salient reinforcement value of the stimulus before them 
(instead of taking into account other, associated emotions 
-i.e., reinforcement values) (Damasio, 1994). This results 
in such individuals’ marrying prostitutes, gambling away 
life savings, and engaging in immediately reinforcing but 
ultimately devastating behavior. Further support for this posi-
tion was provided by the introduction of the Iowa Gambling 
Test (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 2007). With 
this they set out to determine whether “deciding advanta-
geously in a complex situation [...] requires overt reasoning 
on declarative knowledge, namely, on facts pertaining to 
premises, options for action, and outcomes of actions that 
embody the pertinent previous experience. An alternative 
possibility was that overt reasoning is preceded by a non-
conscious biasing step that uses neural systems other than 
those that support declarative knowledge” (p. 293). The 
study and further research supported the latter view. 
The “cold” and “hot” cognition debate continued for 
several years, with researchers such as Denckla (1996) and 
Welsh & Pennington (1988) on the side of “cold” cogni-
tion, and the Iowa group siding with a “hot” cognition 
view. Armengol (2007) provides a review of the debate, 
concluding that indeed, the evidence pointed to a neces-
sary role for emotions and values in adaptive behavior. It 
was concluded that indeed, reasoning and the regulation 
of behavior were influenced by emotions and values. 
Armengol (2007) expanded her discussion to include the 
role of social values and customs in the performance on 
neuropsychological tasks. Subsequent research has pro-
vided unequivocal evidence not only of the necessity of 
those factors in executive functioning, but has enriched our 
understanding of those processes with discoveries relating 
to the medial prefrontal cortex as a site specialized in the 
processing of such components of executive function. This 
contrasts with dorsolateral regions, concerned with tasks 
that could be considered more likely to engage in behaviors 
more traditionally associated with “cold cognition” (e.g., 
Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000). 
The assessment of executive functions in clinical practice
As could be predicted, Luria’s approach to the assess-
ment of executive and other cognitive functions in the 
clinic was qualitative, and driven by his extensive fund of 
knowledge that derived from more “analytical” scientific 
methods. In undertaking a neuropsychological investiga-
tion (to borrow from Anne-Lise Christensen), he elicited 
information from his patients by methodically presenting 
them with tasks to solve. This he did systematically, using 
procedures he developed over time, and through which he 
built a neuropsychological (he actually called it psycho-
neurological) model of the “working brain”. Many of his 
clinical procedures are described throughout several of his 
books (e.g., Higher Cortical Functions in Man, 1966; The 
Working Brain, 1973a).
A thoughtful compilation of common clinical procedures 
utilized by Luria was published by Anne-Lise Christensen 
while observing him in the clinic. It was published in Eng-
lish, on Luria’s recommendation (Christensen, personal 
communication), under the title Luria’s Neuropsychologi-
cal Investigation (Christensen, 1975). An unforeseen turn 
of events occurred as the manuscript reached clinicians 
clamoring for tools to assess the cognitive and functional 
capacities of individuals who presented with possible or 
known neurological dysfunction. A scoring and interpre-
tive manual was created by Golden, Purisch & Hammeke 
(1985), and sold along with Christensen’s assessment kit. 
This came to be known as the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsy-
chological Battery, or LNNB. It consisted of the test items 
described by Christensen, which were scored along 11 
scales, to which 3 were added, ostensibly, to detect “brain 
damage”: one pathognomonic, a “profile elevation scale”, 
and an impairment scale. Scales were also available to 
localize damage to right or the left hemisphere.
Papers soon appeared with titles as pointed as “Have 
they come to praise Luria or bury him?” (Spiers, 1981), 
where the argument was made that cloaking the instrument 
with an actuarial mantle was not only outrageous, and 
tantamount to an affront to Luria, but bespoke an absolute 
lack of understanding of the principles behind this approach. 
Other criticisms were levied around the incompleteness of 
the tool as a “comprehensive instrument” for the detection 
of brain damage, where a person with an unmistakable 
aphasia would be deemed neurologically intact on the basis 
of his performance on the test (Delis and Kaplan, 1982).
All in all, it must be abundantly clear that understanding 
brain function and dysfunction is a complex undertaking 
and “neuropsychology by the numbers” (as the legendary 
Edith Kaplan disparagingly referred to it), is a hazard-
ous undertaking. The concept of primary and secondary 
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deficits is relevant here. For example, one would not wish 
to be evaluated by a neuropsychologist who interprets 
depressed scores on attention, verbal learning and recall 
tasks as indicators of underlying physiological disruption 
of all three areas. Further, a pediatric neuropsychologist 
who concludes, after assessing a young child, that a head 
injury has had minimal impact and fails to consider future 
difficulties caused by damage to association cortices inte-
gral to successful reading or math (that have yet to come 
“on-line”) would be equally negligent. Much preparation 
in the inter-relationship of various affective and cognitive 
processes is necessary before a person can be deemed quali-
fied to assess individuals for possible neuropsychological 
impairment. 
The positivistic approach to the assessment of executive 
functions
Having covered the qualitative, syndrome-driven inves-
tigation of neuropsychological functioning as practiced by 
Luria and his followers, we now turn to other approaches 
to assessing executive function: those derived from a more 
typical “classical”, actuarial perspective. A historical review 
of clinical neuropsychology in North America (mostly in 
the U.S.A.) is well beyond the scope of this article (but see 
Benton, 1991; Armengol, Kaplan & Moes, 2003; Lezak, 
Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012).
What is most apparent at the outset is that in contrast 
with the significant advances attained in the neurosciences, 
the clinical armamentarium available to assess this most 
complex set of abilities lags significantly behind. A few 
instruments such as the Wisconsin Card Test, the StroopTest, 
Trail Making Test, Tower of London and variants that have 
sprouted along the way have been the major tools available 
for the evaluation of executive function for decades (Lezak, 
Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012). It is of note that despite 
the emphasis that American psychologists have tradition-
ally placed on the valid, objective, reliable and accurate 
measurement of psychological traits, few instruments live 
up to those expectations (especially that purport to measure 
executive function). A longstanding matter of significant 
concern in the field has been the paucity of good normative 
studies for those instruments, particularly where demographic 
factors, which have a major impact on executive functions 
(e.g., Fortuny, Garolera, Hermosillo, et al., 2005; Armen-
gol, 2007; Manly, 2005; McKay, 2003) are concerned, not 
to mention the issue of ecological validity. While efforts 
have been made to address those concerns, they are few and 
far between. Attempting to address diverse backgrounds of 
the clinical population faced by neuropsychologists in this day 
and age becomes quite daunting. The issues are so many and 
so complex that a truly fair, ecologically sensitive test that 
addresses the unique sociodemographic characteristics of 
the individual being evaluated would practically amount 
to constructing a comprehensive evaluation system for a 
population with an n = 1.
An alternative: A norm-informed Process Approach.
An analytic, hypothesis-driven, syndrome-guided process 
approach was developed by Edith Kaplan in Boston in the 
1970’s (Kaplan, 1988; 2002). It is based on Heinz Werner’s 
developmental perspective where, most famously, it is the 
process, not the score “achieved”, that provides the examiner 
with the appropriate level of analysis to understand a person’s 
neuropsychological profile. On the basis of this profile, and 
by engaging in systematic hypothesis-testing of factors that 
could be potentially contributing to a disordered function, 
the clinician may be better able to assist in the diagnostic 
process. More importantly perhaps, insights and information 
gained from such endeavors will provide solid knowledge 
about the person’s unique pattern of strengths, weaknesses 
and strategies, for use in treatment and rehabilitation. This 
flexible approach lends itself not only to the assessment of 
individuals with various neurological injuries that require 
adaptations in ‘standard’ administration of the test, but can 
also be fruitfully applied to the assessment of individuals 
for whom no appropriate normative scores are available 
(i.e., in multi-cultural and multi-lingual settings). 
This approach is very much in keeping with Luria’s, 
and not surprisingly, Elkhonon Goldberg (1990a) sees it 
in this manner. A number of instruments are utilized by 
adherents of the Process Approach; others that have been 
developed along the way are also used. Administration and 
interpretation are approached from an epigenetic perspective, 
such that processes that led to a final answer or product are 
noted or further investigated. This is accomplished by test-
ing components of complex tasks separately to determine 
how they contribute to incorrect solutions. 
The Boston Process Approach was taught by Dr. Ka-
plan at the Boston VA Medical Center, usually to pre- or 
post-doctoral Psychology interns. Her approach was dis-
seminated by herself and her students through workshops 
and conferences. It was, however, with the publication of 
The WAIS-R as a Neuropsychological Instrument in 1991 
(Kaplan, Fein, Morris & Delis, 1991), that procedures com-
monly used in the clinic by Dr. Kaplan and her trainees began 
to be used more widely. The manual, which was promoted 
as an adjunct to the more traditional, psychometric test 
developed by David Wechsler, provided examiners with 
systematic ways to analyze an examinee’s performance, 
and procedures to parse out the various components of 
complex tasks. A limited amount of normative data was 
available for those procedures.
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The Process Approach is now so embedded in the newest 
instruments produced by the major assessment publishing 
companies that it is hard to remember a time when this 
approach to the assessment of neuropsychological func-
tions was virtually unknown in the U.S.A. The important 
contribution of these instruments was that they provide a 
template by which comparable adaptations can be developed 
to assess not just ‘verbal learning’ and ‘executive functions’, 
but also a “subcomponent analysis” of the subcomponents 
of each of those broad areas. While normative data can 
be very helpful, we would argue that in some cases they 
can obscure significant individual differences relevant to 
interpretation of test performance and that it is the method 
of hypothesis testing and process analysis that provides 
their most salient contribution. 
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-
KEFS, Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) is a compilation 
of (a) modified versions” of already available instruments 
for which process analyses were developed, and (b) tests 
developed by the authors using a process perspective and 
later incorporated into the System. Importantly, the “System” 
was not conceived as a “battery” (a combined score is not 
calculated), and the authors make it abundantly clear that 
it is not to be used as such. 
Another approach to address the issue of individual dif-
ferences and Neurophenomenology is that of Sedó (Sedó, 
2007; Sedó & DeCristóforo, 2001). Sedó has ingeniously 
developed instruments that rely on very low levels of educa-
tion and cross-culturally accessible stimuli (e.g., up to five 
dots on a card, pictures of fruits, basic colors, etc.). This 
allows for standardized assessment of executive functions 
while presumably minimizing sociocultural influences. 
These tests have successfully been employed in a number 
of different cultural-linguistic settings across the world 
(Sedó, 2001).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have described two historically im-
portant but different epistemological approaches to human 
executive functions. From the positivistic perspective there 
is the assumption of an invariant external reality, which is 
registered by the senses. In contrast, the Romantic perspec-
tive endeavors to obtain an in-depth understanding of a 
person’s experience of the world, particularly when there 
has been significant neurological injury. This approach 
relies heavily on case studies to understand how damage to 
specific functional areas affects the person’s entire outlook 
and functional ability. This approach emphasizes the interac-
tion and inter-dependency of different functional systems. 
The third and most recently developed epistemological 
perspective we describe, Neurophenomenology, can in 
some ways be seen as an extension of the Romantic ap-
proach, but with an increased awareness of how individual 
experience determines the meaning of their interaction with 
the environment and others around them. For example, a 
young white male who sees a white police officer may feel 
an increased sense of protection and personal safety; a young 
black male, on the other hand, may experience apprehension 
and an increased sense of personal threat. The responses 
of either person on a task that requires concentration and 
problem-solving skills at that moment is likely to be af-
fected by their different experiences of the same percept 
(see, for example, McKay, 2003). An ‘embodied cognition’ 
perspective (such as Neurophenomenology) argues that their 
responses are affected by their entire experience, including 
the affective and physiological components. Thus the fear 
generated by experience in one person will also produce a 
physiological response that fundamentally influences and 
determines the percept and reaction, as well as the memory 
of that experience. 
We have described two different approaches to the as-
sessment of executive functions that have resulted from 
these different epistemological conceptualizations. In the 
first case there is a reliance on standardized testing and 
normative comparisons as a basis for understanding what 
is essentially an invariant and modular conception of a 
person’s abilities. In the second case, the emphasis is on the 
interaction of multiple functional systems and the result-
ing phenomenological experience of the person. Such an 
approach relies on detailed observations of the processes 
whereby the person approaches tasks, and on hypothesis 
testing to determine what are primary versus secondary 
deficits, within a historical and developmental framework. 
The ‘embodied cognition’ approaches to the assessment 
of executive functions are still evolving. The work by the 
Iowa lab (Damasio, Bechara and colleagues) is an example 
of how somatic feedback in high and low risk situations 
can influence decision-making and behavior. Future exten-
sions of this work will further explore the physiological, 
cognitive and affective conditions under which responses 
to the same task change. 
Hopefully, scientists will come to the realization that just 
as the brain is unified in its collaboration among various 
processes, thinking and action proceed in the same man-
ner. The epistemological dichotomy that has characterized 
human inquiry historically is reminiscent of damage to the 
corpus callosum, where the analytic functions of the left 
hemisphere are disconnected from the synthetic functions 
of the right. A more fine-grained analysis of the impact of 
differences in personal experiences on executive functions 
and thus behavior (i.e., ‘embodied cognition’) is an important 
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and timely development for clinicians. By reviewing these 
different approaches, we hope to provide the reader with a 
clearer understanding that interpretation of a test score on 
tasks of executive functioning depends on more than an 
analysis of process and understanding of the interaction of 
neurological systems; in fact, it should be extended to an 
appreciation of the person’s phenomenological and bio-
psychosocial history. 
REFERENCES
Armengol, C.G. (2007). Executive functions in Hispanics: 
Towards an ecological neuro-psychology. In: B.P. Uzzell, 
M. Ponton & A. Ardila (Eds.), International Handbook of 
Cross-cultural Neuropsychology (pp.163-180). Nahawah, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Armengol, C.G., Kaplan, E. & Moes, E.J. (2003). Neuropsycho-
logical Assessment. In: R. Fernández-Ballesteros (Ed.), Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Assessment. London, England: Sage.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H.,Tranel, D. & Damasio, A.R. (2007). 
Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous 
strategy. Science, 275,1293-1295.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H. & Damasio, A.R. (2000). Emotion, 
decision making and the orbitogrontal cortex. Cerebral 
Cortex, 10, 295-307.
Benton, A.L. (1991). The prefrontal region: Its early history. In: 
H.S. Lewis, H. M. Eisenberg & A. L. Benton (Eds.), Frontal 
lobe function and dysfunction (pp. 3-32). New York, N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press.
Bilder, R.M. (2012). Executive control: Balancing stability and 
flexibility via the duality of evolutionary neuroanatomical 
trends. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14, 39-47. 
Boring, E.G. (1950). A History of Experimental Psychology 
(2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Christensen, A.L. (1975). Luria’s neuropsychological investi-
gation. New York, N.Y.: Spectrum.
Cole, M. (1990). Alexandr Romanovich Luria: Cultural psy-
chologist. In: E. Goldberg (Ed.),Contemporary neuropsy-
chology and the legacy of Luria (pp. 11-28). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Cowart, M. (2005). Embodied Cognition. Internet Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy ISSN 2161- 0002, http://www.iep.utm.
edu/embodcog/.
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and 
the Human Brain. New York, N.Y.: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.
Delis, D. & Kaplan, E. (1982). The assessment of aphasia with 
the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery: A case cri-
tique. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 50, 
32-39.
Delis, D.C., Kaplan, E., & Kramer, J.H. (2001). Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function System (D-KEFS). San Antonio, TX: 
The Psychological Corporation.
Denckla, M.B. (1996). AS theory and model of executive func-
tion: A neuropsychological perspective. In: G.R. Lyon and 
N.A. Krasnegor (Eds.), Attention, Memory and Executive 
Functions (pp. 263-278). Baltimore: Brookes. 
Fortuny, L.A.I., Garolera, M., Hermosillo, D., et. al. (2005). 
Research with Spanish-speaking populations in the United 
States: Lost in the translation; a commentary and a plea. 
Neuropsychology, 27, 555- 564. 
Goldberg, E. (1990a). Tribute to Alexander Romanovich Luria 
(1902-1977). In: E. Goldberg (Ed.), Contemporary neuro-
psychology and the legacy of Luria (pp. 1-10). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Goldberg, E. (1990b). Higher cortical functions in humans: A 
gradient approach. In: E. Goldberg (Ed.), Contemporary 
neuropsychology and the legacy of Luria (pp. 229-269). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Golden, C.G., Purisch, A.D. & Hammeke, T.A. (1985). A Manual 
for the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery Forms 
I and II. Los Angeles, CA: Western Psychological Services.
Guski-Leinwand, S. (2009). Becoming a science: The loss of 
the scientific approach of Völkerpsychologie. Zeitschrift 
Für Psychologie/Journal Of Psychology, 217, 79-84.
James, W. (1902/2012). The Varieties of Religious Experience: 
A Study in Human Nature. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kaplan, E., (1988). A process approach to neuropsychological 
assessment. In T. Boll & B.K. Bryant (Eds.). Clinical Neu-
ropsychology and Brain Function: Research, Measurement, 
and Practice (pp. 129-167). Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychological Association.
Kaplan, E. (2002). Serendipity in science: A personal account. 
In: T. Stringer, E. Cooley, & A. L. Christensen (Eds.), 
Pathways to Prominence in Neuropsychology: Reflections 
of Twentieth Century Pioneers. (pp. 157-170), New York, 
N.Y.: Psychology Press.
Kaplan, E., Fein, D., Morris. R. & Delis, D. (1991). WAIS-R 
as a Neuropsychological Instrument. San Antonio, TX: The 
Psychological Corporation.
Lezak, M.D, Howieson, D., Bigler, E., & Tranel, D. (2012). 
Neuropsychological Assessment (5th ed.). New York, N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press.
Luria, A.R. (1966). Higher Cortical Functions in Man. New 
York, N.Y.: Basic Books.
Luria, A.R. (1973a). The Working Brain: An Introduction to 
Neuropsychology. New York, N.Y.: Basic Books.
Luria, A.R. (1973b). The frontal lobes and the regulation of be-
havior. In K. H. Pribran & A. R. Luria (Eds.), Psychophysi-
ology of the Frontal Lobes. New York, N.Y.: Academic 
Press.
Luria, A. R., Cole, M., & Cole, S. (1979).The Making of mind: 
A Personal Account of Soviet  Psychology. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
79EpistEmology in thE study of ExEcutivE funtion
Manly, J.J., (2005). Advantages and disadvantages of separate 
norms for African  Americans. The Clinical Neuropsycholo-
gist, 19, 270–275. 
McKay, P.F. (2003). The effects of demographic variables and 
stereotype threat on Black/White differences in cognitive 
ability test performance. Journal of Business and Psychol-
ogy, 18, 1–14.
McNerney, S. (2011). A brief guide to embodied cognition: why 
you are not your brain. Scientific American, Nov. 4,1.
Manrique-Tisnés, H. (2008). Saber y conocimiento: Una aproxi-
mación plural. Acta Colombiana de Psicología, 11, 89-100.
Miller, G.A., Galanter, E. & Pribram, K.H. (1960). Plans and 
the Structure of Behavior New York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston.
Murzi, M. (2005). The Vienna Circle. Available at http://www.
iep.utm.edu/v/viennaci.htm. Accessed May 18, 2014.
Pribram, K.H. (1973). The primate frontal cortex-executive of 
the brain. In: K.H. Pribram & A.R. Luria (Eds.). Psycho-
physiology of the Frontal Lobes (pp. 293-231). New York, 
NY: Academic Press.
Pribram, K.H. (1990). The frontal cortex-A Luria/Pribram rap-
prochement. In: E. Goldberg (Ed.), Comtemporary neuro-
psychology and the legacy of Luria (pp. 77-98). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ribe, N. & Steinle, F. (2002). Exploratory experimentation: 
Goethe, Land, and color theory. Physics Today, 55, 43.
Richardson, A. (2001). British Romanticism and the Science of 
the Mind. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Sacks, O. (1990). Luria and “romantic science.” In: E. Gold-
berg (Ed.), Contemporary  Neuropsychology and the legacy 
of Luria (pp. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Sedó, M.A. (2007). FTD- Test de los Cinco Dígitos. Madrid, 
Spain: TEA Editores. 
Sedó, M.A. & DeCristóforo, L. (2001). All language verbal 
tests free from linguistic barriers. Revista Española de Neu-
ropsicología, 3, 68-82. 
Sepper, D.L. (2005) Goethe and the Poetics of Science. Janus 
Head, 8, 207-227. 
Spiers, P. A. (1981). Have they come to praise Luria or to bury 
him? The Luria-Nebraska Battery controversy. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 331-341.
Stanley, S (2012). Intimate distances: William James’ intro-
spection, Buddhist mindfulness, and experiential inquiry. 
New Ideas in Psychology, 30, 201-211.
Taylor, E.I. (2012). Science, philosophy and religion in psy-
chology, the legacy of William James, In: W.R. Rieber 
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of the History of Psychological Theo-
ries. (pp. 976-984). New York, N.Y.: Springer.
Varela, F.J., Thompson, E & Rosch, E. (1991) The embodied 
mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Varela, F.J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological 
remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 3, 330-349.
Wahl, D.C. (2005). “Zartre Empirie”: Goethean Science as a 
Way of Knowing. Janus Head, 8, 58-76.
Welsh, M.C., & Pennington, B.F. (1988). Assessing frontal 
lobe functioning in children: Views from developmental 
psychology. Developmental Neuropsychology, 4, 199-230.
Wikipedia, Color Theory. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Color_theory. Retrieved May 8, 2014.
Wilson, R. A. & Foglia, L. (2011). Embodied Cognition. In: 
E. N. Zalta (Ed.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wong, W. (2009). Retracing the footsteps of Wilhelm Wundt: 
Explorations in the disciplinary frontiers of psychology and 
in Völkerpsychologie. History of Psychology, 12, 229-265.
